



ASSOCIATION OF
CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS



Home Office

FOCUS ON THE VICTIM: SUMMARY REPORT ON THE ASB CALL HANDLING TRIALS

April 2012

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Home Secretary Foreword



It is often easy to overlook the harm that persistent anti-social behaviour can cause. I know that many police forces, councils and housing providers have made great strides over recent years, but we still hear of victims reporting the same problem over and over again and getting an inadequate response.

These long-running problems – and the sense of helplessness that goes with them – can destroy a victim’s quality of life and shatter a community’s trust in the police. That is why we have been working with eight police forces and their local partners to test a new approach to handling anti-social behaviour calls from the public. The aim was to focus on the harm that victims experience – rather than just ticking boxes on a form – and to quickly identify and deal with the highest-risk cases.

The eight forces involved were integral to the design and development of these trials. Each force developed their own ideas, with help from the Government and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and each force was free to innovate and adapt their scheme to what they found worked in their local area.

There is more to do but the initial results have been encouraging. Forces have reported improved caller satisfaction, better and quicker identification of vulnerable victims, and closer working with other agencies in dealing with those high-risk cases. Most importantly, forces have been able to identify high-risk individuals – often people experiencing the most horrendous abuse and who otherwise might have slipped through the net – and they have taken action to make that abuse stop.

The other major benefit of these trials has been in the impact they have had on police officers and staff. Forces have described how focusing on the harm caused to the victim, rather than the nature of the anti-social behaviour itself, has helped their officers to realise just how damaging anti-social behaviour can be.

It is because of this success that we are now publishing the results of the trials. Our aim is for other police forces and their partners to see what has worked in practice so that they too can consider introducing a similar approach.

I am very grateful to the eight volunteer forces – Avon and Somerset, Cambridgeshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, the Metropolitan Police Service, South Wales, Sussex, and West Mercia – for leading these trials and for sharing their findings. I would encourage other forces and areas to learn from their experience and to use this report as a guide to adopting a better call handling and case management approach to anti-social behaviour. In that way, more communities can benefit and more vulnerable victims can be helped.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read 'T. May'.

The Rt Hon Theresa May MP

ACPO Foreword



One of the core purposes of policing is to keep people safe. The Police Service of England and Wales believes that all individuals and communities have a right to live their lives free from intimidation, harassment and other disorders that damage their quality of life.

Generally, citizens do not recognise a distinction between crime and anti-social behaviour: they call us when something bad is happening to them or in their neighbourhoods, and they ask us to do something to stop it happening. We are very clear that one of the key priorities for public services is the protection of the public from the harm caused by both crime and anti-social behaviour.

The police service recognises that the most serious incidents will always have a huge impact on any individual or community no matter how resilient or strong they are. Most people will suffer little harm from less serious incidents and most communities are resilient enough to withstand such incidents. However, some people and some communities suffer greatly from even apparently minor incidents. Sometimes these incidents are part of a wider pattern or they have been going on for some time. Some victims are more vulnerable to the harm that crime or anti-social behaviour can cause. The police and our partners need to be able to identify those people or areas most at risk from harm and respond in the most appropriate manner.

This need, identifying those at risk and responding properly, was at the heart of the call handling and case management trials. Police officers, police staff and partners developed better ways to handle and share information; to use that information to ensure the right response was provided to individuals; and they found better ways for different organisations to work together to deal with cases.

The trials also looked at better ways to consult with communities and to identify local people's priorities. Anti-social behaviour is a local priority in many communities. It is vital that we develop better ways to engage with and involve people. Anti-social behaviour cannot be 'solved' by public services alone. Society requires confident and resilient communities, demonstrating a culture of mutual respect between people. The report also highlights several challenges: improving our response will require changes to our cultures as well as to our procedures; we need to keep bureaucracy to a minimum; and we must lawfully overcome any misplaced reluctance to share information where that stands in the way of us doing our best for victims.

All eight forces, working locally with partners, have approached the trials with enthusiasm and I am pleased at the innovation and creativity displayed in this report. I thank them and I commend the best practice contained in the report to other forces and their partners. I firmly believe it will allow us to deliver a better service to individuals and to communities and help us to keep them safe.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a series of loops and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Assistant Chief Constable Simon Edens
ACPO Anti-Social Behaviour Portfolio Lead

1. Introduction

1. The term ‘anti-social behaviour’ was defined in law in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, to describe the everyday nuisance, disorder and crime that mattered to local people but which many police forces and partner agencies were not prioritising. The definition was accompanied by civil powers such as the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), which were intended to provide an alternative to criminal prosecution in cases where it was difficult to prove that a crime had been committed, or where victims were afraid to give evidence against their neighbours.
2. We have come some way since then. In September 2010, Sir Denis O’Connor, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), published ‘Stop the Rot’, his review of the way the 43 police forces in England and Wales respond to anti-social behaviour. He reported that there had been significant improvements, that all forces list anti-social behaviour as a strategic priority, and that neighbourhood policing in particular can make a big difference when done properly.
3. However, anti-social behaviour is still the crime and policing issue that matters most at local level, and in 2010/11, over three million incidents of anti-social behaviour were reported to the police in England and Wales. Many more were reported to other local agencies such as local councils, and housing associations, or not reported at all.
4. Sir Denis noted that in many police forces, there was still a culture of prioritising ‘real’ crime over anti-social behaviour. Fewer than half of forces were able to identify local anti-social behaviour issues and troublespots, and allocate resources accordingly. Fewer still could identify repeat and vulnerable victims when they called for assistance. He also noted that many local partnerships focused on long-term strategies over short-term action to protect victims and communities.
5. We need to work with the police, councils, social landlords and others to challenge that prevailing culture. The reason – as illustrated all too clearly by recent tragic cases – is that what is sometimes dismissed as ‘mere’ anti-social behaviour can not only be crime, but can also cause serious harm, particularly where it is targeted at a specific individual. Where agencies fail to spot that harm, or to tackle the problem effectively, the consequences can be devastating, not just in the most extreme cases, but in the much larger number of people and communities whose lives are blighted by daily harassment and the fear that goes with it.
6. The call handling and case management trials described in this report represent a ‘bottom-up’ effort to shift practitioners’ focus from logging types of anti-social behaviour, to protecting victims and communities from harm. The detailed findings of each of the eight forces that participated in the trials accompany this report, and any other agency wishing to adopt the call handling and case management approach to anti-social behaviour would doubtless find it worthwhile to study those findings in depth. In this document, however, we offer a summary of the key lessons learned, and highlight some useful resources for agencies looking to improve the service they offer victims of anti-social behaviour.

2. Protecting repeat and vulnerable victims – five key principles

7. Some recent tragic cases involving vulnerable and repeat victims highlighted a number of weaknesses in the local partnership response to anti-social behaviour. They included: agencies treating new incidents in isolation, rather than as part of a sustained and targeted campaign; not appreciating the harm caused by the anti-social behaviour; and agencies failing to share information or develop a structured response to vulnerable and repeat victims.
8. Such cases are an extreme example of what can go wrong when what is dismissed as ‘mere’ anti-social behaviour actually masks a much more serious problem. But those weaknesses were not a localised one-off. Instead, they reflect concerns that practitioners themselves have raised for a number of years.
9. The issues were crystallised in a report by HMIC in September 2010, on the way the 43 police forces in England and Wales respond to anti-social behaviour. HMIC found that whilst all forces said they took anti-social behaviour seriously, and some – together with their local partners – were doing an excellent job, standards of service varied significantly from area to area.
10. Most worrying was the variation in police forces’ capacity to identify and protect vulnerable and repeat victims of anti-social behaviour. HMIC found that out of the 43 police forces in England and Wales, only 22 were able to effectively identify repeat victims at the point of report, and only 16 of the 43 forces could effectively identify vulnerability. Only 13 forces could effectively identify those individuals who were most at risk – vulnerable and repeat callers – when a call was made.

ASKING THE EXPERTS WHAT WORKS

11. Keen to test a new ‘localist’ way of working, Home Office officials worked with colleagues from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group (SLCNG) to find out which local areas were recognised as providing an excellent service to victims of anti-social behaviour, and what they were doing differently to the rest.
12. This work identified five core principles at the heart of a more effective approach to dealing with anti-social behaviour, focused on harm to the victim or community, rather than categorising the behaviour itself. They were:
 - an effective call handling system for anti-social behaviour incidents, logging information from the first point of contact so that repeat callers and high-risk cases are flagged up;
 - assessing the potential risks to victims early on in the call handling process;
 - using simple, ‘off-the-shelf’ IT to share information between local agencies and enable a more joined-up approach to protecting victims at risk;
 - all agencies dealing with anti-social behaviour in an area having a shared set of case management principles; and
 - a robust community engagement process to identify issues which are causing the most harm to individuals and neighbourhoods, and how the police, other local agencies and the public can work together to address them.

13. On an individual basis, these principles were tried and tested. For example, a number of forces were using risk assessment tools to help them identify victims of anti-social behaviour who may be at a high risk of harm, or to identify hate crimes. Other areas were using freely-available IT packages to share information between agencies. No area, however, was applying all five at once – although a number had indicated informally that they were keen to try.
14. ACPO wrote to all 43 police forces, seeking volunteers willing to test ways of providing a better service to victims and communities by implementing all five principles with the support of partner agencies. Fifteen submitted bids, and a group comprising representatives from the Home Office, ACPO, NPIA and SLCNG selected eight volunteers, ensuring a mix of large and small, urban and rural forces – Avon and Somerset, Cambridgeshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, the Metropolitan Police Service, South Wales, Sussex, and West Mercia.

A 'BOTTOM-UP' TRIAL

15. In keeping with the wider shift away from top-down direction towards local, democratic accountability on crime and policing issues, the eight participating forces were given complete discretion to implement the five principles in a way that suited their circumstances. That included the freedom to change or adapt their approach during the trials in response to emerging issues or problems.
16. The Home Office and ACPO took on a joint project coordination role, by providing a range of support where requested, including:
 - identifying emerging issues and lessons, and sharing them with other participants;
 - tailored training and briefings on the roles of partner agencies and different approaches to anti-social behaviour;
 - training for call handling staff;
 - professional advice and support to forces and other agencies on risk assessment tools, IT and community engagement techniques; and
 - supporting participant seminars and learning sets.
17. NPIA also set up a dedicated forum on POLKA, the police online collaboration site. The participating forces used POLKA to share their emerging thinking with each other and with other forces, posting key documentation online to compare notes (e.g. question-sets used by call handlers, risk scorecards, and process maps).
18. Home Office research analysts also helped the volunteers design an assessment process to capture key findings so that other forces could easily understand what had been tested in each area, and what lessons had been learned in the process.

19. The trials were announced in January 2011, and ran until the end of July. The eight forces then conducted their own self-assessments. They submitted their evaluations to the Home Office at the end of September, setting out what they had done, what had worked well, what hadn't worked, and what they thought the outcome had been.
20. The feedback from the trials supports the changes made in April 2011 to the anti-social behaviour categories in the National Standard for Incident Recording and Assessment (see the text box below). The three new categories of anti-social behaviour incidents (personal, nuisance and environmental) are used by all forces in England and Wales and have helped reinforce the cultural shift to assessing risk and responding appropriately rather than focusing on recording incidents.

THE NATIONAL STANDARD FOR INCIDENT RECORDING AND ASSESMENT (NSIRA) 2012: ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Anti-social behaviour is defined in the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) as acting 'in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the perpetrator.' This definition includes low-level public order offences and other offences which are notifiable crimes and therefore beyond the remit of National Incident Standard Recording and Assessment (NSIRA). A more appropriate definition of anti-social behaviour for the purposes of incident recording is provided by the Housing Act (1996): 'Engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance to persons engaged in lawful activities'.

Since April 2011, the treatment of anti-social behaviour in NSIRA has reflected a case management ethos rather than an incident recording process approach. It considers the spectrum of harm and the needs of victims. It encourages the management of risk and emphasises problem-solving. The three simplified categories (personal, nuisance, and environmental), reduced from the original 14, change the emphasis from merely recording and responding to incidents to identifying those vulnerable individuals, communities and environments most at risk and therefore in need of a response before the problems escalate. The three categories are explained as follows:

'Personal' is designed to identify incidents that are deliberately targeted at a particular individual or specific group or aimed at having an impact on a particular individual or specific group rather than the community at large;

'Nuisance' captures those incidents where an individual or group causes trouble, annoyance, inconvenience, offence or suffering to people in the local community in general rather than being deliberately targeted at specific individuals or groups; and

'Environmental' deals with the interface between people and places. It includes incidents and inconsiderate actions which have an impact on the surroundings including the natural, built and social environments. This category is about encouraging reasonable behaviour whilst managing and protecting various environments so that people can enjoy their own private spaces as well as shared or public spaces.

Further work and consultation with all 43 police forces is ongoing as part of the review of the NSIRA incident categories.

3. A guide to the eight volunteer forces

The eight volunteer forces (**highlighted**) were a mix of rural, semi-rural and urban force areas from the 43 police force areas in England and Wales.

1. Avon and Somerset Constabulary

2. Bedfordshire Police

3. Cambridgeshire Constabulary

4. Cheshire Constabulary

5. City of London Police

6. Cleveland Police

7. Cumbria Constabulary

8. Derbyshire Constabulary

9. Devon and Cornwall Police

10. Dorset Police

11. Durham Constabulary

12. Essex Police

13. Gloucestershire Constabulary

14. Greater Manchester Police

15. Hampshire Constabulary

16. Hertfordshire Constabulary

17. Humberside Police

18. Kent Police

19. Lancashire Constabulary

20. Leicestershire Constabulary

21. Lincolnshire Police

22. Merseyside Police

23. Metropolitan Police Service

24. Norfolk Constabulary

25. Northamptonshire Police

26. Northumbria Police

27. North Yorkshire Police

28. Nottinghamshire Police

29. South Yorkshire Police

30. Staffordshire Police

31. Suffolk Constabulary

32. Surrey Police

33. Sussex Police

34. Thames Valley Police

35. Warwickshire Police

36. West Mercia Police

37. West Midlands Police

38. West Yorkshire Police

39. Wiltshire Police

40. Dyfed-Powys Police

41. Gwent Police

42. North Wales Police

43. South Wales Police

MAP OF THE 43 POLICE FORCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES



AVON AND SOMERSET

The Avon and Somerset force area covers 1,855 square miles with an approximate population of 1.6 million. Avon and Somerset has six policing districts covering both urban and rural communities. Bristol is the smallest district geographically but, with a population of 406,000 residents, it is the most densely populated. It also has a large transient population. Somerset West is the largest police district; it covers a diverse range of economic, community and geographic areas, including the two large market towns of Taunton and Bridgwater. In 2010/11 there were 84,338 incidents of anti-social behaviour recorded by the police¹ in Avon and Somerset. The British Crime Survey (BCS)² survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 10% of people in Avon and Somerset perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.avonandsomerset.police.uk

CAMBRIDGESHIRE CONSTABULARY

Cambridgeshire Constabulary submitted a joint bid to participate in the trials together with the Fenland Community Safety Partnership. The key stakeholders - Fenland District Council, Roddons (a Registered Housing Provider) and Cambridgeshire Fire and Rescue Service - formed a **Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group**. The trial took place in the Fenland area – a predominantly rural area located in the north-eastern part of the county, including the town of Wisbech. Fenland is sparsely populated (approximately 95,000 residents) with many diverse communities with different needs, and is Cambridgeshire's most deprived district. In 2010/11 there were 42,435 incidents of anti-social behaviour recorded by the police in Cambridgeshire. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 9% of people in Cambridgeshire perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.cambs.police.uk

LEICESTERSHIRE POLICE

Leicestershire Police is situated in the middle of the East Midlands forces, surrounded by Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire. It serves the populations of Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. Anti-social behaviour remains a key strand of work for all Community Safety Partnerships, and the call handling trials were conducted across the entire force area. All of the relevant local authorities were involved, together with a range of other partners, including: Victim Support; Leicestershire Police Authority; the Probation Service; the Youth Offending Service; and Leicester University. In 2010/11, there were 39,368 incidents of anti-social behaviour recorded by the police in Leicestershire. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 10% of people in Leicestershire perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.leics.police.uk

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- 1 The statistics on number of recorded ASB incidents for each of the eight trial forces are as presented in the Home Office Statistical Bulletin on crime statistics in England and Wales for 2010/11. Incidents are recorded under the National Standard for Incident Recording and Assessment (NSIRA). While incidents are recorded under NSIRA in accordance with the same 'victim focused' approach that applies for recorded crime, these figures are not accredited National Statistics and are not subject to the same level of quality assurance as the main recorded crime collection
 - 2 The statistics on the public perceptions of ASB for each of the eight trial forces are as presented in the Home Office Statistical Bulletin on crime statistics in England and Wales for 2010/11 as taken from the British Crime Survey.

LINCOLNSHIRE POLICE

Lincolnshire is a mainly rural county bordering the North Sea and the Wash. The force encompasses small villages, market towns, and one city. The county has a population of 665,270. There are population clusters in the south of the county, and the largest urban centre is the city of Lincoln. The rural and sometimes isolated eastern coastal areas of Skegness and Mablethorpe have a high influx of tourists in the summer. Lincolnshire is twice the size of any other county in the East Midlands region. There were 37,952 incidents of anti-social behaviour recorded by the police in Lincolnshire in 2010/11. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 8% of people in Lincolnshire perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.lincs.police.uk

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE

The Metropolitan Police Service covers a geographical area covering 32 local authority areas or boroughs. The residential population of London is 7.1 million, which increases with a daily influx of workers from outside London and a varied night-time economy. Levels of deprivation vary widely across the Metropolitan Police Service area, and London has three boroughs that are listed in the top 20 worst deprived areas in the UK. The call handling trial was conducted in four boroughs – Hackney, Harrow, Lambeth and Richmond. The Metropolitan Police Service recorded 419,765 incidents of anti-social behaviour in 2010/11. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 21% of people in the Metropolitan/City of London (the London region) perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.met.police.uk

SOUTH WALES POLICE

South Wales Police covers around 10% of the geographical area of Wales, but the force area has 1,225,900 residents, over 40% of Wales' entire population. Cardiff and Swansea are the major urban centres, but the force area also includes the South Wales valleys. The force is made up of 232 neighbourhoods and is split into four divisional areas:

- Northern Division (Merthyr and Rhondda Cynon Taff)
- Eastern Division (Cardiff)
- Western Division (Neath Port Talbot and Swansea)
- Central Division (Vale of Glamorgan and Bridgend)

There were 90,608 incidents of anti-social behaviour recorded by South Wales Police in 2010/11. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 24% of people in South Wales perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.south-wales.police.uk

SUSSEX POLICE

Sussex is split into three administrative areas – East Sussex, West Sussex and the City of Brighton and Hove. East and West Sussex are two-tier authorities, whilst Brighton and Hove is a unitary authority. Both county council areas are a mixture of urban and rural areas and both have a coastline. East Sussex has a number of areas of high deprivation. Brighton has a large transient population, owing to tourism, a large night-time economy and a significant Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community – Brighton Pride is one of the largest events of its kind in the country. There were 91,470 incidents of anti-social behaviour recorded by the police in Sussex in 2010/11. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 13% of people in Sussex perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.sussex.police.uk

WEST MERCIA POLICE

West Mercia Police is responsible for policing a diverse region of 2,868 square miles, making it the fourth largest police force area in England and Wales. Whilst the area has five large urban areas - Worcester, Redditch, Hereford, Shrewsbury and Telford - the region is predominantly rural, with some areas, particularly Herefordshire and Shropshire, deemed 'sparse' in population terms. The five territorial policing units are – Herefordshire, North Worcestershire, South Worcestershire, Shropshire and Telford and Wrekin. The call handling trials were held in the Telford and Wrekin. There were 75,013 recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in West Mercia in 2010/11. The British Crime Survey (BCS) survey for England and Wales in 2010/11 recorded that 8% of people in West Mercia perceived a high level of anti-social behaviour in their local area.

www.westmercia.police.uk

4. Adapting the five principles – what the forces did

21. Each force adopted its own approach to the trials. For instance, five of the eight conducted their trials across the whole force area, whereas the **Metropolitan Police Service** focused on four boroughs (Hackney, Harrow, Lambeth and Richmond), and **Cambridgeshire** and **West Mercia** concentrated on a particular area (Fenland District, and Telford and Wrekin respectively). **Cambridgeshire** submitted a joint bid to participate in the trials, with the Fenland Community Safety Partnership.
22. Similarly, not every force focused equally on all five principles. For example, **Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group** concentrated primarily on creating an effective call handling system, risk assessment and use of IT, whilst **Sussex** looked particularly at call handling, risk-assessment and case management. In some cases – such as **Avon and Somerset**, and **Leicestershire** – the trials were a way of building on existing initiatives to improve their response to anti-social behaviour.
23. The participants also used different governance arrangements to manage the trials and capture the key lessons. In the **Metropolitan Police Service**, overall governance for the trial's structure sat with a high-level steering group, whilst each borough appointed a senior manager as the working lead. In **South Wales**, the Safer South Wales Advisory Group (SSWAG) produced a cross-partnership strategy for the trials.
24. The different approaches are explained in more detail in the forces' own evaluations which accompany this report. However, here we have attempted to capture some of the highlights under each of the five principles.

AN EFFECTIVE CALL HANDLING SYSTEM, LOGGING INFORMATION FROM THE VERY FIRST CALL

25. The aims of an effective call handling system are two-fold. Firstly, to capture enough information about the victim and the incident they are reporting at the first point of contact to identify the most appropriate response by the police and partner agencies. Secondly, to store that information so that if the victim calls again, the call handler knows that they are a repeat caller, what incidents they have reported in the past, and what action has been taken.
26. These are some examples of how forces applied that principle:
 - **West Mercia** and **Leicestershire** have both installed Customer Relationship Management systems that show call handlers when previous incidents have been reported from the same telephone number, with repeat victims flagged on the system.
 - In **Leicestershire**, the system also highlights where callers – particularly those identified as high-risk cases – appear on other police systems, and allows call handlers to pass information to officers en route to an incident.
 - In **Avon and Somerset**, the system prompts call handlers to ring victims back within 24 hours to undertake a more detailed risk assessment. Avon and Somerset are now aiming to call 100% of high-risk victims back within 24 hours.
 - In **Lincolnshire**, an important first step was agreeing a common definition of 'repeat victim' between all agencies involved in tackling anti-social behaviour, making it easier to agree a threshold for joint intervention.

ASSESSING THE RISK TO VICTIMS EARLY IN THE CALL HANDLING PROCESS

27. The aim of systematic risk assessment is to identify those cases where anti-social behaviour is causing, or could result in, serious harm to the victim, either as a one-off or as part of a targeted campaign. This then provides the basis for multi-agency intervention to manage high-risk cases – both in terms of protecting those vulnerable victims who need support, and dealing with the perpetrators. It allows for a more proportionate response to those incidents which clearly do not present a high risk, ensuring police and agency resources are targeted where they are needed.
28. All the participating forces used some sort of risk assessment, but they developed and tested a range of different approaches. Some forces' call handlers assessed risk by taking victims through a set of questions the system brought up automatically when they first took the call, with trigger points for issues like hate crime. Others made an initial judgment of victims' vulnerability over the phone, with officers undertaking a more detailed risk assessment during the follow-up visit. In both cases, the important thing was to clearly and consistently identify cases where an active response was required, and to share that information with other officers and partner agencies.
29. Several forces found that standard risk processes and templates (e.g. a standardised Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) published by the Home Office in 2009) were too restrictive. They either shortened or amended the question-set to meet local needs, or built in a greater role for professional judgment and common sense. The need to train staff in how to use the risk assessment properly was also a common theme in the forces' evaluation reports.
30. These are some examples of what forces did:
 - in many forces, prompts have been added to call handling systems so that staff use a tailored set of questions to assess risk at the first point of contact with a victim;
 - similarly, most forces use this process to identify victims as being at 'high', 'medium' or 'standard' risk, with high-risk victims flagged for immediate response and multi-agency support;
 - in **Leicestershire**, the most vulnerable victims are referred to the force's Comprehensive Referral Desk (CRD), where they are supported by a range of specialist officers who deal with vulnerability and wider safeguarding issues;
 - most forces adopted a common risk assessment process with partner agencies. In **Lincolnshire**, all partners agreed to use the same question-set to initially assess risk to callers, to ensure consistency when identifying vulnerability, repeat victims and potential hate crimes. The **Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group** amended individual stakeholder risk assessment processes, to create a common tipping point for upgrading a case from 'Medium' to 'High';
 - in London, due to high incident volumes, **Metropolitan Police Service** call handlers conduct an initial screening for victim vulnerability, based on a drop-down menu on the system. A more detailed risk assessment is then undertaken by the investigating officer. High-risk cases are flagged for immediate attention. Vulnerable and repeat victims' cases are then mandatory items at daily tasking meetings in the four trial boroughs;

- in **West Mercia**, front-counter staff have also been trained in risk assessment, to deal with victims who walk in off the street to report anti-social behaviour; and
- **Avon and Somerset** use the risk assessment again, at the end of an investigation, to further assess a victim's vulnerability before deciding to close down a case.

USING OFF-THE-SHELF IT TO SHARE INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENCIES

31. IT interoperability within organisations – let alone across local agencies – has long been an issue. Similarly, one of the most common barriers reported by practitioners to adopting a genuinely multi-agency approach to anti-social behaviour is the difficulty in sharing sensitive information. The idea here – based on examples of what had worked well in other areas – was to find practical, low-cost ways of getting round those problems, rather than the more traditional bespoke (and expensive) IT solution.
32. Using off-the-shelf IT in this way allows information on vulnerable and repeat victims to be shared between agencies (i.e. 'joining the dots' where anti-social behaviour is having an impact across a range of local services), and also allows high-risk cases to be managed in 'real time'. The aim at the start of the trials was also for better connectivity to reduce the need for face-to-face meetings between partners.
33. It is worth noting that there are still some wider concerns within agencies over IT security and data protection. Whilst such concerns, and the impact they have on behaviours, are to an extent understandable, there is a clear basis in legislation for prioritising the need to prevent harm to members of the public.
34. Here are some examples of the different approaches participating forces took:
 - **Cambridgeshire** and **Sussex** have both trialled an encrypted, 'cloud-based' IT system which allows partners to share information on high risk victims and jointly manage cases online. The system is underpinned by Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) between agencies, and written, informed consent from victims is needed before their information can be entered onto the system;
 - **Leicestershire** and key partners (e.g. Leicester City Council, Leicestershire County Council, and Borough and District Councils) are undertaking a feasibility study into another 'cloud-based' IT system for information sharing;
 - **Avon and Somerset** has given local authority staff in the South Gloucestershire District 'read-only' access to the force's Incident and Intelligence Management System, which has reduced duplication of effort and has enabled partners to share information on cases and work together to resolve them; and
 - **South Wales** and partners have invested in a jointly-owned, web-hosted anti-social behaviour database, which links incidents reported to a range of agencies to individual victim records – this makes it much easier to identify repeat and vulnerable victims.

AGREEING A JOINED-UP APPROACH TO MANAGING CASES

35. Ensuring police and partner agencies work together to manage anti-social behaviour cases is crucial to finding a long-term solution that stops further harm to the victim. In particular, local partners need clear, shared protocols for handling those cases where the victim is judged to be at high risk or vulnerable. The protocols could include general principles on when to open a case, triggers for intervention by different agencies, thresholds for use of various tools and powers, legal considerations and the requirements for closing a case.
36. Here are some examples of what the participating forces and their partners did:
 - **Lincolnshire** noted that the police and partner agencies worked to different definitions of anti-social behaviour, with the police looking at crime and ‘solvability’ whilst partners focused on the needs of victims, potential harm and opportunities to intervene to reduce the anti-social behaviour. They have now adopted a common terminology, including a definition of ‘repeat victim’, which is reflected in the existing county-wide case management system;
 - **South Wales** worked with partners to introduce common standards for six strategic areas of the partnership response to anti-social behaviour: contact management; initial response; ASB units; repeat and vulnerable victims; hotspot management; and ASB case review forums. The partnership feels that this work has improved partnership working and service delivery and that it has built on previous arrangements whereby multi-agency staff are co-located; and
 - in **Sussex**, West Sussex Division created a set of standards with partners, which includes agreed time-limits for conducting risk assessments and reviewing cases of the most vulnerable victims. In Brighton and Hove, high-risk cases automatically trigger a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC).

A ROBUST COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PROCESS

37. In the past, the police and other agencies sometimes took their steer on anti-social behaviour priorities from central government, for example by focusing on the seven indicators highlighted in the British Crime Survey (litter, vandalism and graffiti, abandoned cars, teenagers ‘hanging around’, drunk or rowdy behaviour, people using or dealing drugs, and noisy neighbours). However, the move away from ‘box-ticking’ on the basis of particular categories of behaviour towards focusing on the harm to victims depends on a more sophisticated understanding of what is happening locally, and what matters to people.
38. Finding new and more effective ways to engage communities on anti-social behaviour should enhance local accountability and transparency, helping agencies target their resources more effectively by giving victims a louder voice. New technology, particularly social networking tools, may also help agencies reach groups who tend not to respond to traditional forms of engagement, such as surveys.
39. Some examples of forces’ approach to community engagement during the trials are set out below:
 - the **Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group** worked with wider partners to develop an existing social media resource called Shape Your Place (www.wisbech.shapeyourplace.org), which includes Facebook, Twitter and Flickr sites. The site allows members of the public to report issues

of concern as well as find out about local events. Local people have been trained as community reporters to cover community events. In Wisbech, a Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) submits blogs in Lithuanian, with an accompanying English translation, in order to engage with hard-to-reach communities; and

- **Leicestershire** has updated its approach to community engagement after finding that the previous approach tended to focus on discrete projects or statutory processes. The new approach includes a community engagement research project called ‘Circles of Need’ where the police and partners were trained to develop ‘customer journey maps’ to better understand the experiences and feelings of vulnerable victims.

5. Results and next steps

40. The ‘bottom-up’ nature of the trials, and the fact that forces were encouraged to adapt their approach as they went, means that assessment has focused more on qualitative, rather than quantitative, outcomes. We have not looked for evidence of an overall impact on levels of anti-social behaviour in the eight trial areas, but – for example – for changes in the way that victims feel about the way their case was handled, improvements in the identification of vulnerable victims or whether call handlers believe they are better able to manage high-risk cases.
41. Although the forces have more to do to embed the victim-focused approach to anti-social behaviour as ‘normal business’, the results of the trials have been very encouraging, with all participants noting some or all of the following: faster, more consistent identification of repeat and vulnerable victims of anti-social behaviour; increased caller satisfaction; some cultural shift amongst front line staff towards a focus on harm to the victim; and improved multi-agency handling of high-risk cases. Below are some highlights from the eight assessment reports that accompany this document:

BETTER IDENTIFICATION OF VULNERABLE AND REPEAT VICTIMS

- Before the trials, **Cambridgeshire** noted that, “there was no formal risk assessment carried out by Cambridgeshire Constabulary on victims of ASB”. Since the trials, all partners within the Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group have concluded that, “understanding and identification of harm has improved” and “more joined up processes have been developed in support of those at most risk of harm.”
- **Leicestershire** believes that, “the risk assessment process denotes a major change for police and partners and is key in supporting the organisation’s abilities to prevent vulnerable and anti-social behaviour cases slipping through the net.”
- **Lincolnshire** recognised that “in many cases the force failed to register and capture the vulnerability of victims” and that there was a “lack of knowledge and understanding in respect to what makes a person vulnerable. This was found to be the case across the force including Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). There was no clear definition of a repeat victim in respect of anti-social behaviour, and many call takers were not aware that many callers were repeat victims before ever contacting the police.” Following the trials Lincolnshire, “now risk assesses 75% of ASB callers, with a target of 100%. The force has a clearer picture of repeat and vulnerable victims and deploys resources more effectively. Partners have adopted the same risk assessment process and are achieving 100% of callers being properly risk assessed.”
- In **South Wales** the new anti-social behaviour database provides the means by which a victim-driven approach to incident recording can be managed, with incidents attached to records for individual victims rather than relying on the use of name and address flags on the South Wales Police incident record management system. This has been particularly important when identifying vulnerable and repeat victims of anti-social behaviour.

IMPROVED SERVICE TO CALLERS

- **West Mercia** noted that “100% of Telford ASB victims surveyed by telephone were satisfied with the manner they were treated by the police.”
- In **Avon and Somerset**, the 24-hour call-back to all victims has had a positive impact on the majority of callers who reported anti-social behaviour. However, the force realises that call-back was made to some “victims who do not require further risk assessment” and is now “seeking to effectively respond to 100% of vulnerable and repeat victims rather than calling back 100% of victims.”
- **Cambridgeshire** states that the use of a “call handling question set/risk assessment enables call takers to conduct a more structured and focused conversation with callers. There is evidence that this has positively influenced caller satisfaction levels.”

CULTURAL SHIFT TOWARDS A FOCUS ON HARM TO VICTIMS

- The **Metropolitan Police Service** notes that, “a key factor in improving ASB management is the ability to change mindsets of all staff in order to recognise the importance of ASB and improve their understanding of anti-social behaviour risks, vulnerability and repeat victimisation. It is vital that the harm and impact that offences can have on communities is fully understood. This long term work must continue to underpin the MPS approach to ASB management.”
- Within **South Wales**, across the seven CSPs, there was universal agreement that the management of anti-social behaviour had become substantially more victim-focused as a result of the project.
- **West Mercia** outlines the harm-focused approach to victims as follows: “the spectrum of harm concept should be at the heart of our policing model. By adopting this approach, we avoid the dangers of ‘policing by categories’ whereby a predetermined response is provided by officers, staff and partners.” The report goes on to say that, “we prioritise our response to the most vulnerable or those suffering the greatest harms. Practitioners approach incidents with an open and an enquiring mind to establish what has happened, who has been harmed or who is at risk of harm and how we can respond in a way that prevents further harm.”
- The **Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group** recognised that, although there was some evidence of the effective use of the new harm-focused and partnership approach to anti-social behaviour, more work was needed before, “the process became business as usual.” They go on to say that, “for this reason, local monitoring and challenge were considered essential and line managers were responsible for ensuring that officers and staff understood and complied with the process.”

IMPROVED MULTI-AGENCY HANDLING OF HIGH-RISK CASES

- The **Metropolitan Police Service** reported that the trials, “raised awareness, increased partnership work and anecdotal evidence has highlighted improved effectiveness of partnership work as a result of a greater understanding of social housing powers.”

- **West Mercia** focused on the “use of care plans, as plans of action to be undertaken, rather than a log of what has been done. These need to be agreed with partner agencies and victim/complainant in advance of action being taken.”

LESSONS LEARNED

42. Forces have also highlighted some key learning points and challenges, which emerged during the trials:

- **Information Sharing** – several forces noted a continued (and deeply ingrained) reluctance to share sensitive information between agencies, based on over-interpretation of the current legislation. Engaging security and data protection lead officers early, particularly if new IT is involved, was therefore felt to be critical to the success of the call handling approach;
- **Training** – many of the participating forces have given call handlers training in the use of risk assessments. However, there is a recognition that the quality of the risk assessment will depend to an extent on the individual and on the pressure on the call centre at the time (e.g. the volume of ‘live’ calls). Several forces have said that training needs to be reinforced with some degree of local monitoring, in the short-term, to ensure new procedures are being followed, and in particular to avoid a risk-averse approach that classes every victim as vulnerable – ‘just in case’. This goes hand-in-hand with the process of reviewing outcomes to ensure that the risk assessment process is working properly – for example, several forces had to fine-tune the thresholds to ensure that all the cases identified as ‘high-risk’ genuinely were; and
- **Bureaucracy** – clearly, whilst there is a need to improve the service to repeat and vulnerable victims of anti-social behaviour, there is also a need to minimise unnecessary bureaucracy. Several forces noted initial staff concerns that new processes for assessing risk and identifying vulnerable and repeat victims would introduce more bureaucracy and, for example, would affect call centre performance. However, in some forces, those concerns decreased during the trial period as it was recognised that the new processes allowed more appropriate handling of ‘standard’ risk cases as well as high risk ones. In the longer-term, this approach should also reduce repeat calls from victims whose cases are being more effectively managed.

NEXT STEPS – THE TRIAL FORCES

43. The eight trial forces will continue to develop the call handling and case management approach, and to work with their partners to address the learning points and challenges outlined. **West Mercia** and the **Metropolitan Police Service** will be rolling out the new procedure across the whole force area. **Cambridgeshire** is assessing the potential to roll out the new procedures across the county.

NEXT STEPS – SUPPORT FOR OTHER FORCES AND AGENCIES

44. A number of other forces and agencies have shown interest in adopting the call handling and case management approach to dealing with anti-social behaviour, and this is something we are keen to encourage. Those interested should read the more detailed assessment reports from each participating force, which will provide a useful guide to the key operational and organisational considerations.
45. We have also attached, as annexes to this document, some sample tools which other interested forces and agencies may find helpful, including:

- a training video;
- examples of simplified call handler question-sets for risk assessment;
- a sample risk assessment process;
- a sample information sharing agreement between agencies of a communal IT system;
- an example of Common Minimum Standards across partnerships; and
- some case studies, illustrating how the project has changed forces' approach to repeat and vulnerable victims.

NEXT STEPS – THE HOME OFFICE, ACPO AND OTHER NATIONAL PARTNERS

46. The call handling and case management trials offer a valuable model of a new 'bottom-up' way of testing new ideas, where the implementation is genuinely owned at local level, which the Home Office and other national partners support and facilitates. For example, SLCNG have pledged to continue supporting the further development of a more integrated multi-agency approach to managing antisocial behaviour in the eight force areas and, as well as promoting and encouraging take-up of the approach by other areas.
47. A key step towards our commitment to cutting crime and empowering citizens to keep their neighbourhoods safe is to make it easier to contact the police and report crime and disorder. In January 2012, the national roll-out of the '101' non-emergency number was completed, marking a significant step forward in our ambition to reconnect the police and public. The introduction of the '101' number gives the public across England and Wales one easy and memorable number to contact their local police force for crimes and concerns that do not require an emergency response. Over time, and subject to local agreement, the '101' number could enable local partners to join up with the police to provide communities with easier access to a wider range of local services.
48. It is important that we learn any lessons from these trials about our role and capture them for similar work in the future. For example, the Ending Gang and Youth Violence report highlighted the need to review information sharing guidelines and practice so that a clear and simple approach is agreed across all agencies. This will ensure that partners clarify the need to share information and proactively share relevant data. This will also result in improved targeting of resources by agencies involved.
49. The Home Office will work with ACPO to evaluate feedback from the trial forces and their partners on what we did well during the trials and we could have done better – either by, for instance, providing more or better 'co-ordination and support. We also encourage all 43 forces in England and Wales to use this Home Office summary report and the eight trial reports as a platform to either build on existing work or to develop their response to vulnerable and repeat victims of anti-social behaviour. We will also work with the Local Government Association (LGA) on plans to highlight the key results from the trials to its membership.
50. HMIC will be repeating its anti-social behaviour inspection of all 43 forces in England and Wales with the report due in the summer. The inspection will focus particularly on the service to repeat and vulnerable victims of anti-social behaviour, which was highlighted again in the Inspectorate's recent work on crime recording.

Annex A

WEST MERCIA TRAINING VIDEO

West Mercia, along with its partners, is committed to providing an outstanding service to the communities which they serve and have been working on the five principles of call handling and case management to achieve this. The video (see hyperlink below) shows how West Mercia and its partners have developed a way of assessing risk at the point of contact and how they have developed partnership working in all areas of business to help victims and communities.

www.sparkdev.co.uk/showcase/show/tackling-anti-social-behaviour

Annex B

SAMPLE QUESTION-SETS FOR CALL HANDLERS

AVON AND SOMERSET

Call handlers ask these questions, which have been integrated into the force's call handling system to make an initial assessment of risk. A caller will be automatically classified as a vulnerable victim if the response to question 13 is "yes".

1. Do you know where the noise/disturbance is coming from?
2. Were weapons involved or mentioned?
3. What type?
4. Where are the weapons now?
5. How many people are involved?
6. Was the disturbance physical or verbal?
7. Are you in immediate danger?
8. Exactly where are they now?
9. Where is the offender/person responsible now?
10. Has anyone been using alcohol or drugs?
11. Is there a court order/restraining order in place?
12. Is anyone sick or injured?
13. Have you or your family been subject to repeat incidents of anti-social behaviour?
14. If yes, how often?
15. If yes, has it been directly targeted at you or your family?
16. If yes, why do you think you're being targeted?
17. Has it affected your health or lifestyle?
18. If yes, does it place you, your family or your property at risk of harm?

WEST MERCIA

Call handlers ask structured and scripted questions which appear automatically when a call about anti-social behaviour is taken and the incident is recorded. There is a prompt for mandatory action when a potential hate crime is identified:

- 1) What exactly is happening?
- 2) Has this happened before?
- 3) How many are there and what are their ages?
- 4) Do you know who is involved, their names and where they live?
- 5) Have you or your family had problems like this before (Y/N)
- 6) If Yes, how often (and are they linked)
- 7) Why do you think this is happening to you or your family?
- 8) **Prompt.** Do you think it is because of you or your family's faith (any), ethnicity, sexuality, age, disability, health issues or any other reason?
If Yes, **MANDATORY** attendance)
- 9) How have you or your family been affected by this?
- 10) Is there anyone that you can contact to support you at this time?


Annex C

SAMPLE RISK ASSESSMENT FLOWCHARTS


Some trial forces have used flowcharts or process maps to explain the new victim-focused approach to call handlers, police officers and key partners. Examples from **Avon and Somerset** and **West Mercia** are shown here.

AVON AND SOMERSET

ASB RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS



WEST MERCIA



Annex D

ASB RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS – CAMBRIDGESHIRE STAKEHOLDER WORKING GROUP

The following documents, numbered 1 – 4 are from the **Cambridgeshire Stakeholder Working Group** and are an example of how that partnership undertakes their risk assessment process in their response to calls about anti-social behaviour.

1. ASB CALL HANDLING GUIDANCE FOR CALL HANDLERS

From 1st March 2011 an Incident file record will no longer be automatically generated upon closure of ASB CC3 incidents by using certain codes. Instead non crime 301 reports will be completed by staff attending victim centred ASB where, after risk assessment, the victim is identified as vulnerable.

You must be fully aware of how to risk assess a person's vulnerability and complete this on a case by case basis. What may seem trivial to one victim could have a significant impact on another. Vulnerability is not just about the nature of the incident but the surrounding factors and circumstances that impact on the victim's daily life. There is no limit to what these factors or circumstances could be. There is a need to keep an open mind and talk to the victim to identify the bigger picture.

A majority of initial ASB reports are received in the FCR and PSC. You will assess whether what is reported is ASB and whether attendance is required. You will also assess the vulnerability of the caller at this initial call handling stage. The current question set for ASB incidents has been revised to provide additional guidance. The questions will now be:

1. Have you been subject to this type of incident before?
2. Think about the impact on the victim. Is the victim vulnerable? Consider the following factors:

K – Keep the Victim safe

E – Economic issues?

E – Equality and Discrimination?

P – Personal circumstances?

S – Sickness / disability?

A – Available support?

F – Family circumstances?

E – Environmental Issues?

Active listening combined with combinations of these prompts will assist in the decision on grading of the incident and whether attendance is necessary. Where there is a victim who has been subject to 3 or more incidents of ASB within 30 days these incidents are graded "Response".

A guidance table has been produced to help you assess whether or not attendance is necessary and then how staff should deal with those incidents attended.

	Guidance on Decision Making		
	Low Harm Little Impact	Moderate Harm, Moderate Impact/ distress	Significant Harm/ Impact
Isolated Incident/ Intermittent, no Pattern	Standard risk	Standard risk	Medium risk
Regular occurrence, likely to continue without intervention	Standard risk	Medium risk	High risk
Likely to escalate or wide- spread effects	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk

Standard risk – No police attendance required. Call taker completes full write on CC3. NPT will review as part of daily search through incidents in their area.

Medium risk – Officers attend. Dynamic risk assessment of vulnerability conducted using professional judgement. If medium risk, complete non crime 301 with minimum investigations (1-10). Risk assessment matrix will be completed either at the time of report or if deemed appropriate under the circumstances, at a later stage by NPT. Make Sergeant aware.

High risk – Officers attend. Dynamic risk assessment of vulnerability conducted using professional judgement. If victim is identified as high risk of harm and vulnerable complete non-crime 301 and action as a **priority approach involving multi agency consultation**. Make Duty Manager/ Sector Commander aware immediately and set action plan to remove, avoid, reduce or manage harm and monitor the factors identified. Risk assessment matrix will be completed either at the time of report or if deemed appropriate under the circumstances, at a later stage by NPT.


The questions set will remain for all current ASB incidents where it pops up but not for Vehicle noise nuisance.

Guidance on write off of standard risk ASB incidents

Where professional judgement dictates that either no resource is sent to an ASB incident or attending staff do not raise a non crime 301, adequate detail of the initial investigation undertaken needs to be recorded on the relevant Command and Control 3 incident before closure. This will enable an informed later review of the incident by the NPT staff as part of local scanning and analysis.

Decision as to the level of update provided is down to the professional judgement of the call taker or attending officer/ Police Community Support Officer (PCSO). The write off needs to outline in sufficient depth what has happened, including full details of all victims, witnesses and offenders/ suspects if known. Descriptions of any offenders/ suspects should be recorded if available. The write off should also record names and addresses of any other persons spoken to as a result of initial local enquiries undertaken such as house to house etc. Details of any paperwork submitted should also be recorded – GAP forms, intrepid entries etc. Details of other available evidence such as CCTV should also be highlighted.

2. FLOW CHART SHOWING PROCESS FOR DEALING WITH ASB INCIDENTS



3. RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (RAM)

Name:		Incident Number:	
Address:		Incident file Number:	
Tel No:		Score	Scoring options
Offence	Other than this occasion how often do you have problems?		0 – none previously
			3 – occasionally
			5 – Frequently
	Do you think that incidents are happening more often and/or are getting worse?		0 – No
			2 – Yes
Offender	Do you know the offenders?		0 – No
			1 – Yes
			2 – Know each other well
	Is anyone in particular being specifically targeted by this behaviour?		0 – No
	1 – A number of people		
	2 – Your family		
	Do you feel that this incident is associated with your faith, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, age, gender or disability?		0 – No
			3 – Yes
	Does the perpetrator (or their associates) have a history of or reputation for intimidation or harassment?		0 – No
			2 – Have not harassed the complainant, but have a history or reputation for harassment or violent behaviour.
			3 – Have harassed the complainant in the past.
			5 – Currently harassing the complainant
Impact	How affected have you been by what has happened?		0 – Not at all
			2 – Changed routine or avoid locations
			4 – Distressed.
			6 – Affected physical or mental health
	Do you have any friends, family or professionals to go to for support?		0 – A close network of people to draw on for support.
			1 – A few people to draw on for support.
	3 – Lives alone and is isolated.		
	In addition to what has happened, do you feel that there is anything that is increasing you or your household's personal risk (e.g. because of personal circumstances?)		0 – No
			3 – Yes
Scale	Are any other agencies involved with this problem?		
	Apart from any effect on you, do you think anyone else has been affected by what has happened?		
OFFICER'S PERSONAL ASSESSMENT			
Reasons:			
Officer's assessment: STANDARD/MEDIUM/HIGH			
SCORE:	0-11 = STANDARD 12-23 = MEDIUM 24+= HIGH	OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT: STANDARD / MEDIUM / HIGH	
Officer completing assessment: Signature:		Officer supervising: Signature:	
Name: Collar Number:		Name: Collar Number:	


CONSENT TO INFORMATION SHARING

I consent to agencies obtaining and sharing information (including the 'internet cloud based IT system') as part of the multi-agency work to help and secure my safety and that of my family. If there are child protection concerns, information will be shared regardless of whether this form is signed.

SIGNATURE: _____

PRINT NAME: _____ DATE: _____

4. FLOW CHART SHOWING PROCESS FOR INPUTTING PROFILES ON THE 'INTERNET CLOUD BASED IT SYSTEM'



Annex E

SAMPLE INFORMATION SHARING AGREEMENT BETWEEN AGENCIES OF A COMMUNAL IT SYSTEM

SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SAFER FENLAND PARTNERSHIP (SFP) CONCERNING THE USE OF AN INTERNET CLOUD-BASED IT SYSTEM

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this service level agreement (SLA) is to outline the agreement between the organisations within the Safer Fenland Partnership (SFP) in relation to the use of an “internet cloud-based IT system”. This SLA provides the detail of how the process will function.

The SLA provides the details of how each organisation within the SFP will use the internet cloud-based IT system and their roles and responsibilities to ensure that the “internet cloud-based IT system” is used in a consistent, appropriate and efficient way.

Implicit in this agreement is the mutual respect for all organisational values and objectives.

2. BACKGROUND TO INTERNET CLOUD-BASED IT SYSTEM

The SFP recently secured funding to pilot the use of an “internet cloud-based IT system for twelve months. A secure, encrypted IT system, an “internet cloud-based IT system provides the opportunity for improved information sharing between partner agencies, enabling swift exchange of partnership information and intelligence to facilitate quick time problem solving around ASB victims and locations. In particular, it enables the fast time identification of repeat and vulnerable ASB victims and locations, as well as increased focus on provision of more joined up support and monitoring of such victims and locations. It reduces the need for partnership meetings. It also allows partnership ASB case management.

3. BACKGROUND TO SFP

SFP is the Community Safety Partnership for Fenland (CSP).

The common purpose of the SFP is to work together with local and county partners and stakeholders within the Fenland area to improve the joint understanding of harm that impacts on individuals and families at risk of ASB in its widest context. The aim is to improve the understanding and processes with all partners sharing information and engaging in joined up assessment of risk and harm.

An Information Sharing Agreement has been agreed and signed by the relevant parties.

4. AIMS OF THE SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT

The aims of this agreement are to:

- Enable the flow of information between partners, by all persons having a full understanding of their role and responsibilities and the roles and responsibilities of the other parties in relation to the information they input and the information they receive or read.

- Facilitate a co-ordinated, joined up approach to using the “internet cloud-based IT system”
- Enable an effective and efficient common case management process
- Improve connectivity and communication locally
- Facilitate real time, secure, fast and efficient information sharing
- Improve partnership ASB case management
- Ensure that partners are accountable

5. SCOPE OF THE SLA

The parties of the SLA are:

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary
- Fenland District Council
- Roddons Housing Association
- Cambridgeshire Fire and Rescue Service

This SLA commences on the... and will be reviewed in 6 months from that date or sooner by agreement by all parties. Any amendments to the SLA will be agreed by the SFP.

6. JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL PARTIES

The ‘lead agency’ in each case is the organisation creating the profile of an individual. This profile is owned by that organisation and they will lead on the initial case conference and tasks. If it is deemed appropriate at a later date, another partner organisation can take responsibility as lead, co-ordinating activity in support of an individual. Where one agency rates a victim as high risk, then all agencies will treat as such.

If a case is assessed as medium towards high risk by any agency then there will be communications between agencies to discuss the case. All records of discussions and documentation relating to these discussions will be recorded locally in accordance with agency procedures and not on the “internet cloud-based IT system.

Each organisation will assign a district administrative role. Their responsibility will be to add, edit and de-activate all super users and users within their organisation. Overall responsibility for the use of the “internet cloud-based IT system” within each organisation lies with the District administration function. Users can also be given different access permissions. This ensures that information is only shared/ read and searched for by relevant people.

TRAINING

The “internet cloud-based IT system has been developed to ensure that it is user friendly and that any person can use it. There is no need for specialist training. Each organisation will be responsible for ensuring that each user is familiar with how the “internet cloud-based IT system” works.

INPUTTING OF DATA/ CREATION OF PROFILES

All High risk cases must be inputted onto the “internet cloud-based IT system” as soon as practicable and in any case within 24 hours.

All organisations will detail in Section 7 below their individual roles and responsibilities. However, it is essential to ensure that data is inputted at the earliest opportunity to enable real time sharing of information. This will ensure early intervention and the speeding up of processes to safeguard the victim.

It is the responsibility of the user to identify who it is appropriate to share the information with. Information should only be shared with those persons who require the information for a policing purpose and in accordance with the Information Sharing Agreement as signed by the Safer Fenland Partnership.

SUPERVISION

It is the responsibility of the super users/ managers to monitor the action logs and tasks. Any improper use of the system should be dealt with according to local policy. Any breaches of security or data protection should be reported immediately to the SFP.

CASE AUDITS

As well as internal audits the SFP will be responsible for carrying out joint agency case audits. This will be undertaken by the SFP Steering Group. Guidance for completing these audits has been shared with the SFP.

CONTINGENCY PLANS

A contingency plan has been compiled to deal with any issues that arise from the misuse of the “internet cloud-based IT system”, loss of data and data protection and security breaches.

CASE CONFERENCES

Each organisation should ensure that there is suitable representation available to attend a case conference. For high risk cases a joint agency case conference must be called as soon as practicable and in any case within 72 hours. All parties will be expected to attend any meeting where attendance is requested by the lead agency.

WARNING MARKERS

Partners will ensure that they input all warning markers regarding people and locations to protect colleagues and enable a proper risk assessment to be carried out.

TASKING

Notifications of tasks are sent by e-mail to the users specified work e-mail address as well as being logged on the “internet cloud-based IT system”. It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the “internet cloud-based IT system” is checked regularly and that a line manager is aware of any leave of absence to ensure that nothing is missed and case loads are managed.

OUT OF HOURS (EVENING, WEEKEND AND BANK HOLIDAYS)

Where the agency is not a 24/7 service suitable arrangements should be made to cover any high risk calls made to that agency. Roddons and FDC will introduce a protocol ensuring that out of hours call centre staff inform

the Police Service Centre (PSC) of any ASB calls assessed as being high risk. PSC are to raise a CC3 and arrange for an appropriate Inspector or Sergeant to make contact with Roddons/ FDC call centre to discuss.

7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH PARTY

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will:

CREATION OF PROFILE:

- Input all high risk vulnerable ASB victims within 24 hours of the risk assessment. It is the responsibility of the Duty Inspector/ Sector Commander to ensure that the profile is inputted. This can be tasked at DMM if appropriate.
- During office hours Monday to Friday the profile will be inputted by the neighbourhood policing team who covers the area where the victim resides. Should the NPT for that area not be working the “internet cloud-based IT system” SPoC will input the profile. The current “internet cloud-based IT system” SPoC for creating a profile for Cambridgeshire police are
- At evenings and weekends the responsibility for creating the profile lies with the NPT working at the time.

INPUTTING OF DATA/ UPDATES:

Any updates to the “internet cloud-based IT system” should be inputted at the time of completing the relevant task/ update. The “internet cloud-based IT system” can be accessed via a PDA and does not require returning to Roddons offices. If it is not practicable to update the “internet cloud-based IT system” at the time, this must be done as soon as practicable and at the latest prior to the end of the working day.

CASE AUDITS:

Case audits will be carried out by each individual agency. Guidelines have been produced to ensure consistency throughout each agency. Case auditing will be completed by the Force ASB Manager and co-ordinator, in liaison with the relevant Sector Commander.

CASE CONFERENCES:

If a high risk ASB victim profile is created by Cambridgeshire Constabulary they will be responsible for calling a case conference within 24 hours. The Sector Commander, where available, will be responsible for chairing the meeting. Where they are not available the Duty Inspector or NPT Sergeant will be responsible.

CHECKING OF THE INTERNET CLOUD-BASED IT SYSTEM:

Cambridgeshire Constabulary will ensure that the “internet cloud-based IT system” is checked on a daily basis. It is the responsibility of the NPT Sergeants to check the “internet cloud-based IT system” at the beginning of each shift to ensure that all information/ tasks are received and acted on quickly and expediently.

Roddons will:

CREATION OF PROFILE:

- Input all high risk vulnerable ASB victims within 24 hours of the risk assessment. It is the responsibility of the Neighbourhood Manager to ensure that the profile is inputted. This can be tasked to Roddons Neighbourhood Team if appropriate.
- During office hours Monday to Friday the profile will be inputted by the Neighbourhood Officer (NO) who covers the area where the victim resides. Should the NO for that area not be working the NO duty officer will input the profile.
- Roddons will not be inputting data at the weekends.

INPUTTING OF DATA/ UPDATES:

Any updates to the “internet cloud-based IT system” should be inputted at the time of completing the relevant task/ update. The “internet cloud-based IT system” can be accessed via a PDA and does not require returning to Roddons offices. If it is not practicable to update the “internet cloud-based IT system” at the time, this must be done as soon as practicable and at the latest prior to the end of the working day.

CASE AUDITS:

Case audits will be carried out by each individual agency. Guidelines have been produced to ensure consistency throughout each agency. Case auditing will be completed by the Neighbourhood Manager and ASB co-ordinator.

CASE CONFERENCES:

If a high risk ASB victim profile is created by Roddons they will be responsible for calling a case conference within 24 hours. The Neighbourhood Manager, where available, will be responsible for chairing the meeting. Where they are not available the ASB co-ordinator and/or the Neighbourhood Officer will be responsible.

CLOUD-BASED IT SYSTEM MONITORING:

Roddons will ensure that the “internet cloud-based IT system” is checked on a daily basis. It is the responsibility of the Neighbourhood Duty Officer to check the “internet cloud-based IT system” at the beginning of each day to ensure that all information/tasks are received and acted on quickly and expediently.

Fenland District Council (FDC) will:

ENGAGE FULLY IN PROFILE MANAGEMENT:

- Input all high risk vulnerable ASB victims within 24 hours of the risk assessment.
- Manage the Input from FDC users.
- During office hours Monday to Friday the profile will be inputted by the SFP Support Officer or trained personal leading on the case.

- FDC do not have the capability to input data at the weekends, if required the Safer Fenland Partnership Support Officer can be called in to an emergency case conference through the CCTV out of office.

INPUTTING OF DATA/ UPDATES:

Any updates to the “internet cloud-based IT system” should be inputted at the time of completing the relevant task this must be done as soon as practicable and at the latest prior to the end of the working day.

CASE AUDITS:

Case audits will be carried out by each individual agency. Guidelines have been produced to ensure consistency throughout each agency. Case auditing will be managed by the SFP Support Officer

CASE CONFERENCES:

- If a high risk ASB victim profile is created by a FDC employee they will be responsible for calling a case conference within 24 hours.
- The SFP Support Officer where available, will be responsible for chairing the meeting. If they are not available the relevant partner will take the initiative and develop a task/finish response.

CHECKING OF INTERNET CLOUD-BASED IT SYSTEM

FDC will ensure that the “internet cloud-based IT system” is checked on a daily basis by all trained officers. It is the responsibility of each Officer to check the “internet cloud-based IT system daily to ensure that all information/ tasks are received and updates completed to an acceptable and timely standard.

8. CONTACTS

Cambridgeshire Constabulary:

Roddons

Fenland District Council:

Cambridgeshire Fire and Rescue Service

9. SIGNATORIES

Annex F

SOUTH WALES PARTNERSHIP: COMMON MINIMUM STANDARDS

South Wales worked with partners to introduce common standards for six strategic areas of the partnership response to anti-social behaviour: contact management; initial response; ASB units; repeat and vulnerable victims; hotspot management; and ASB case review forums. The partnership feels that this work has improved partnership working and service delivery and that it has built on previous arrangements whereby multi-agency staff are co-located.

STRATEGIC AREA: CONTACT MANAGEMENT

1. Over and above the Police single non-emergency number, each Local Authority should advertise a 24/7 contact number and an e-mail address that can be used by the public to report ASB matters to the Local Authority.
2. Each ASB Unit will ensure that Police and Local Authority contact centres and all agencies that make ASB referrals have current information concerning how to contact the unit by telephone and e-mail and are aware of the hours of business worked within the unit. (Hours of business may extend beyond normal office hours, but will start no later than 0900 and end no sooner than 1600).
3. ASB Unit staff will view and decide on an appropriate response to a referral within 3 working days.
4. If it is unclear whether the reporting party has been re-contacted by the agency to which ASB was reported, a member of the ASB Unit will make contact with them within 3 working days.
5. ASB unit staff will ensure that repeat and vulnerable victims of ASB and relevant partners are kept up to date with case progress.
6. Partner agencies within the CSP will share information between relevant agencies in accordance with current data sharing protocols, through use of and access to the partnership ASB database and through disclosure of relevant data at partnership ASB forums.

STRATEGIC AREA: INITIAL RESPONSE

1. When required all police referrals to be passed to the appropriate agency for action within 48 hours of receipt at the ASB Unit.
2. All actions and interventions undertaken by ASB Unit staff will be undertaken on behalf of the CSP and all communication and information materials will bear the CSP branding.
3. ASB Units will adopt and follow Home Office guidelines in relation to ASB.
4. To ensure a robust response, all referrals that have been correctly classified as ASB will be recorded on the partnership ASB database.
5. In order to have access to data included on the partnership ASB database, agencies will be expected to share appropriate information and intelligence in line with the database agreement and current data sharing protocols.

6. ASB Unit staff will ensure that all Repeat and Vulnerable victims will be flagged to all involved agencies. This will normally be done at partnership meetings but may be circulated sooner than this if necessary. In all cases this will occur within one month of the victim being identified as Repeat or Vulnerable.

STRATEGIC AREA: ASB UNITS

1. Each CSP will ensure that a dedicated co – located ASB unit is in place and that as a minimum its staffing will include:

1 x ASB Co-ordinator
1 x ASB Police Officer
1 x Victim Support / caseworker (may be a volunteer).
Administrative support

Staff within the ASB Unit will (subject to vetting agreements) have access to the Partnership ASB database and SWP Command & Control and Record Management databases

2. Each ASB Unit will act within the priorities set within Safer South Wales Partnership ASB Strategy, which reflects our shared understanding of the need to fully understand the degree of harm that ASB is causing within our communities and to provide an effective partnership response.
3. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities to be drafted and agreed to improve relationships and to achieve a clear understanding of practices and principles between agencies who need to work together to achieve clear outcomes.
4. Each ASB Unit will be committed to the use and future development of the partnership ASB database so as to ensure that it remains an effective tool and fully fit for purpose in monitoring repeat victimisation, ASB perpetrators and hotspot locations.
5. Each ASB unit agrees to adopt shared terminology for the partnership ASB database.
6. Each ASB Unit will have in place a process whereby they will have access to legal advocacy within 5 working days of the ASB Case Review Forum making a decision on legal proceedings.

STRATEGIC AREA: REPEAT AND VULNERABLE VICTIMS

1. Each CSP will adopt the definitions of repeat or vulnerable victims included within the Safer South Wales Partnership ASB Strategy i.e. 3 reports in 3 months (there will be on-going dialogue about the appropriateness of this definition).
2. The decision to classify a person as a repeat and vulnerable victim will be made only by staff within the ASB Unit. Other staff may raise concerns about whether an individual might fit these criteria for consideration by Unit staff. If there are conflicting views on this matter the ultimate decision will rest with a manager within the ASB Unit. Each ASB Unit will identify the manager who will hold this responsibility.

3. Each CSP ASB Unit will be responsible for the case management of repeat and vulnerable victims. This will be carried out via a Single Point of Contact who works within the unit.
4. The agreed standardised risk assessment form will be utilised by each ASB Unit. It will be completed and returned to the ASB Unit within 5 working days by whichever agency undertakes to carry out the risk assessment.
5. ASB cases involving high and medium risk repeat and vulnerable victims will be formally reviewed on a weekly basis by the ASB Unit.
6. Appropriate SWP Command & Control and Record Management database warning markers will be placed against the victim and their address by an appropriate member of staff working within the ASB Unit.

STRATEGIC AREA: HOTSPOTS

1. Each CSP ASB Unit will seek to gather information from as many appropriate sources as possible. ASB Units will monitor the extent to which agencies commit to this process and ensure that there is on-going dialogue about the extent, timeliness and quality of the supply of ASB information received by the Unit.
2. Each CSP ASB Unit will utilise the partnership ASB database to identify ASB hotspot locations within its current capacity to capture this information. Unit representatives will collaborate over future development of the partnership ASB database to include problem location updates.
3. An ASB Hotspot will be defined as a location where the level of threat, risk or harm to the area, or an individual is determined by the ASB Case Review Forum to be having a significant impact on the quality of life of individuals residing in and/or using the area, or the community as a whole and is not responding to normal interventions.
4. Members of each CSP ASB Unit will update a multi-agency Case Review Forum in relation to identified hotspot locations. Agencies will identify emerging hotspot locations to the ASB Unit prior to meetings.
5. Hot spot locations will be agreed through discussion at multi-agency Case Review Forum meetings. During meetings the group will decide upon the most appropriate agency to lead on tackling the hot spot. The ASB Unit will play a supporting and co-ordinating role in relation to subsequent planned activity.
6. All relevant partners & agencies should provide resources to tackle hot spot locations; the extent to which this occurs will be reviewed and discussed during the ASB Case Review Forum meetings.
7. Crime Reduction Tactical Advisors should be utilised to advise the Case Review Forum on problem solving hot spots when appropriate.
8. Where appropriate ASB Unit staff will request that consideration is given to the placing of a police “waymarker” on ASB hotspot locations and will have in place a mechanism for making such requests and reporting on the findings to the ASB Case Review Forum.

STRATEGIC AREA: ASB CASE REVIEW FORUM

1. ASB Case Review Forums will be held on a monthly basis. They will be arranged by the CSP ASB Unit and will have multi-agency attendance. CSPs may choose to manage Repeat and Vulnerable Victims, Offenders and Hotspot Locations under separate meetings, or may combine these elements into a single meeting.
2. Each CSP must have the ability to call an emergency meeting of the ASB Case Review Forum within 24 hours.
3. All members attending the Case Review Forum will operate within information sharing policy and protocols.
4. In order to tackle ASB effectively through the ASB Case Review Forum the following agencies should attend the meetings: Local Authority; South Wales Police; Registered Social Landlords; Health; Social Services; Children's Services; YOS; Vulnerable Persons teams; Voluntary Sector; Probation. Attendees should be empowered to make decisions and commit their agency resources at the meeting.
5. The Case Review Forum must have the ability to co-opt other agencies into the group as and when necessary. These agencies may include: British Transport Police; Environmental Health; Licensing Department; Mediation Services; Victim Support; Neighbourhood Watch; Charities; Schools Liaison Officers; Youth Organisations; Witness Care; Crown Prosecution Service; Parks Department; Vehicle and Operator Services Agency.
6. The Chair of the Case Review Forum meeting will be locally determined. The Chair will monitor attendance take up from agencies and where appropriate feedback any concerns or issues re: attendance to the Head of the CSP.

Annex G

CASE STUDIES

Avon and Somerset

A lives alone and felt extremely intimidated by her neighbour who lives opposite. They share a communal hallway and landing. She was identified as high-risk in March 2011 using the Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM). The ASB related to lots of visitors and young people attending the perpetrator's address resulting in noise nuisance, suspected drug activity, items being thrown from his 5th floor window and abusive language being used. He also got drunk regularly at home and failed to keep his dogs leashed in the communal areas where they were allowed to foul. A felt particularly vulnerable as she believed she would easily be identified as the complainant. A Noise Abatement Notice was served. This was breached twice. The perpetrator refused to sign an Anti-Social Behaviour Contract. The City Council secured a civil injunction against him in June 2011 and this not been breached to date. A is now very happy as the perpetrator has changed his behaviour and she has had no further problems.

Cambridgeshire

The case commenced in June 2011 when an elderly lady reported a range of ASB issues to a Registered Provider. A risk assessment process had now been implemented by each agency involved in the field trial and the internet cloud-based IT system had been launched. The victim was assessed as high risk at the call taker stage and details were entered onto the system to alert other relevant agencies signed up to use the system. The case was discussed by partners at a meeting on 1st July and information then started to be shared between agencies on the system. Consequently, the victim was referred to Adult Social Care and Mental Health for appropriate support. A more co-ordinated, harm centred approach was adopted, with faster time information sharing and intervention in support of an identified vulnerable victim.

Following receipt of a Constabulary Form 102 in respect of the victim, Vulnerable Adult specialists within a Multi Agency Referral Unit (MARU) requested a joint case conference to consider the case. The MARU was set up at the same time that this trial was taking place. Strong links have been forged with the unit to address ASB incidents where the victim is also or vulnerable adult. This request proved unnecessary given the timely action already undertaken but highlighted the need for this unit to have access to the cloud based IT system as part of their role. Vulnerability had already been identified and joint action commenced through risk assessment and information sharing processes implemented as part of the field trial. This case shows that the foundations for a more effective response were in place. The case also highlights the need for a broad range of agencies to engage with any IT system introduced as an information sharing or joint case management tool. Mental health concerns identified in this case could probably have been more accurately assessed and addressed at an earlier stage, had Health and Social Care already had access to the system.

Sussex

This case relates to targeted acts of anti-social behaviour towards a group of vulnerable elderly ladies aged 91, 82, and 65. The ladies were all neighbours in a quiet road. The problems started when a group of five local youths walked past one of the houses and damaged the roses that were growing in her garden adjacent to the footpath. The 82 year old lady came out of her house to challenge the youths, and asked them not to do that, because the roses were planted by her husband who had since passed away. The youths were abusive to her, and this incident was the catalyst to what followed in the days to come. The youths then returned over the next couple of days, throwing things at the houses, causing damage to garden ornaments and causing further damage to flowers.

One of the youths also threatened to “set fire to the house”, and “burn the victim at the stake”. Local NPT officers quickly identified this as repeat victimisation of vulnerable people and visited them all, an ASB risk assessment was completed which scored HIGH, and officers began an investigation and put protective measures in place. The area was made a “directed patrol activity” to increase police activity at the key times. The following day the youths returned again and caused further problems, but this time it resulted in one of the victims suffering a heart attack, and another having chest pains. An ambulance subsequently attended and took one of the victims to hospital. NPT officers arrived quickly at the scene and detained two suspects nearby who fitted the description and admitted to some involvement in the incident. Upon questioning, and realising the seriousness of their behaviour they named the other three youths who had been involved.

There was clear evidence that the anti-social behaviour has been affecting the physical and mental wellbeing these residents who were terrified by what has been happening. One of the victims had taped up her letter box and padlocked her gate due to fears for her safety.

A meeting was quickly arranged, attended by different agencies, and a number of actions were agreed as part of a safety plan. This included crime prevention advice, alarm systems, and fire retardant letter box protection. The five suspects, aged 14-16 years, were all arrested and interviewed, and were given conditional police bail to protect the victims. Three of these suspects were subsequently charged with harassment (currently awaiting trial), and one received a final warning.

The swift intervention of police in identifying this as a high risk case, supporting the victims, and identifying and dealing with the perpetrators, stopped any further incidents occurring and this matter escalating with more tragic consequences.

Local officers maintain regular contact with the victims, who recently sent a thank you card to all of the officers involved for the help and support they had provided to them in dealing with the incidents.



Home Office

ISBN: 978-1-84987-731-1
Published by the Home Office
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